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ABSTRACT 
 
Bargaining and the Gender Wage Gap: 
A Direct Assessment* 
 
An influential recent literature argues that women are less likely to initiate bargaining with 
their employers and are (often) less effective negotiators than men. We use longitudinal 
wage data from Portugal, matched to balance sheet information on employers, to measure 
the relative bargaining power of men and women and assess the impact of the gender gap in 
bargaining strength on the male-female wage gap. We show that a model with additive fixed 
effects for workers and gender-specific fixed effects for firms provides a close approximation 
to the wage structure for both men and women. Building on this model we present three 
complementary approaches to identifying the impact of differential bargaining strength. First, 
we perform a simple decomposition by assigning the firm-specific wage premiums for one 
gender to the other. Second, we relate the wage premiums for men and women to measures 
of employer profitability. Third, we show that changes in firm-specific profitability have a 
smaller effect on the wage growth of female than male employees. All three approaches 
suggest that women are paid only 85-90% of the premiums that men earn at more profitable 
firms. Overall, we estimate that the shortfall in women‘s relative bargaining power explains 
around 3 percentage points – or 10-15% – of the gender wage gap in Portugal. 
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Despite e¤orts to outlaw gender discrimination and the closing of measured skill gaps
between the sexes, women in virtually every country continue to earn less than men (Altonji
and Blank, 1999; Blau and Kahn, 2000; OECD, 2012). The stubborn persistence of the
gender wage gap has led researchers to shift attention away from traditional factors such as
discrimination toward more subtle explanations based on psychological attributes and bar-
gaining behavior. An important strand of this new research, building on evidence from both
lab experiments (Bowles et al., 2005, Bowles et al., 2007; Small et al. 2007; Rigdon, 2012)
and eld settings (Babcock et al. 2006; Save-Soderbergh, 2007; Castillo et al., 2012), argues
that women are less likely to initiate bargaining and are (often) less e¤ective negotiators than
men.1
Although this work makes a credible case that women and men di¤er in their willingness
and ability to bargain over wages, the quantitative impact of these di¤erences on the overall
gender wage gap is unclear. We provide some of the rst systematic evidence on this question
using rich administrative data from Portugal that combines detailed information on hourly
wages with balance sheet data for employers.2 The recent negotiation literature asserts
that women obtain a smaller share of the match surplus associated with their employment
relationships than do men. A fundamental obstacle to assessing this hypothesis is that the
surplus in any given match is unobserved, making it di¢ cult to infer whether women are
in worse matches than men or have lower bargaining power. A growing body of research,
however, suggests there is a large component of wage variation associated with the sharing
of rm-wide rents.3 Building on this literature, we consider several approaches to assessing
1See Bertrand (2011) for a review. Related bodies of work suggest that women are less competitive and
less condent than men, and as a result tend to choose educational tracks, occupations, and jobs that are
associated with lower wages, e.g., Gneezy et al (2003), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), and Buser et al.
(2013).
2An earlier study by Nekby (2003) relates male and female wages to measured protability in a cross
section of Swedish rms, but does not address the potential selectivity issues caused by non-random sorting
of men and women with di¤erent unobserved skill characteristics to more protable rms.
3Modern empirical research on this topic starts with the seminal contribution of Abowd, Kramarz, and
Margolis, 1999. See also Lentz and Mortensen (2010), Barth et al. (2012), and Moscarini and Postel-Vinay
(2012). Card, Heining and Kline (2013) present an overview of recent studies and show that widening
rm-specic wage di¤erentials play an important role in the rise in wage inequality in West Germany.
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the e¤ect of gender di¤erences in bargaining that exploit the matched longitudinal features
of our data.
First, we t gender-specic models of wage determination with xed e¤ects for workers
and rms. Building on techniques developed in Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), we present a
series of specication checks indicating that the additive worker-rm model provides a good
approximation to the wage structure for each gender. Assuming that the rm e¤ects are
proportional to the shares of rm-wide rents received by men and women, simple comparisons
of these e¤ects identify the relative bargaining power of men and women. We show that, given
an appropriate normalization on the rm e¤ects, it is possible to decompose the gender wage
gap into a component due to di¤erential bargaining power and a component due to di¤erential
sorting of men and women to rms. We nd that women capture a smaller fraction of rm-
wide rents than men, and that this di¤erence in bargaining power explains about 3 percentage
points (or 10-15%) of the gender wage gap. A larger share (around 20%) of the wage gap is
explained by the fact that women tend to be employed at lower-rent rms.
This simple decomposition ignores factors other than rent-sharing that may also con-
tribute to rm-specic wage premiums (such as compensating di¤erentials for working condi-
tions). In a second approach, we directly estimate the relationship between the gender-specic
wage premiums paid by a rm and a simple measure of rm protability: value added per
worker. We nd that the estimated wage premiums for both men and women are strongly
correlated with value added per worker, with a smaller e¤ect for women, implying that women
benet less from working at more protable rms. The estimated di¤erences in bargaining
strength imply a similar 3 percentage point impact on the overall gender wage gap.
In a third design, we examine the e¤ects of changes in rm-specic protability (measured
by changes in value added per worker) on the wage changes of men and women who remain
with the rm over a multi-year period. This approach, which mirrors the research design
employed by much of the modern rent-sharing literature (e.g., van Reenen, 1996; Carlsson,
Messina, and Skans, 2011; Card, Devicienti and Maida, 2013), has the advantage of not
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relying on the exogenous mobility assumptions underlying the standard worker-rm decom-
position. To the extent that rms insure workers against transitory shocks to protability
(Guiso et al., 2005) this design may yield attenuated estimates of rent sharing over the relat-
ively short time horizon available in our data. Despite some evidence of such attenuation, we
again nd that womens wages are less responsive than mens to changes in the protability
of their employer, with approximately the same ratio of implied gender specic bargaining
power as found in the previous two designs.
The recent negotiation literature has argued that gender di¤erences in the conduct of
bargaining may have a bigger impact in certain environments  for example, in settings
where there is more situational ambiguity (Bowles et al., 2005) or less information about
other workerswage outcomes (Rigdon, 2012). We compare the relative e¤ect of changes
in protability on mens and womens wages in di¤erent industries, and between larger and
smaller rms and those with di¤erent shares of female employees. We also contrast rms
with higher and lower dispersion in male wages. We nd some evidence that womens relative
bargaining power is smaller in the manufacturing sector, and at larger rms with a greater
share of female workers.
We conclude that, in the aggregate, di¤erences in relative bargaining power explain about
10-15% of the gender wage gap in Portugal. Our ndings contribute to a growing literature
that emphasizes the fundamental role of rms in the wage determination process (Lentz and
Mortensen, 2010). An open question for future research is the extent to which di¤erences in
the average wage premiums paid to men and women by the same rm are due to di¤erences
in the behavior of female employees, versus di¤erences in how employers interact with their
female workers.
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1 Institutional Setting and Data Overview
Our analysis relies on a unique matched employer-employee data set from Portugal, con-
taining high-quality data on workers wages and rm protability. Three features of the
Portuguese labor market suggest to us that our ndings may be broadly generalizable to
other settings. First, women in Portugal have relatively high labor force participation rates,
comparable to the rates in the U.S. and Northern Europe e.g., 58% for all adult women
in 2010 (ILO, 2012). The participation rate of women between the ages of 25 and 45 is
particularly high (over 85%) reecting the strong commitment to work among recent cohorts
of women (INE, 2013). Second, the vast majority of women in Portugal (over 90% of those
in private sector jobs) work full time, suggesting that wage comparisons between men and
women are unlikely to be driven by di¤erences between full time and part time jobs. Third,
the gender wage gap in Portugal is within a few percentage points of the gaps in the U.S.
and U.K., and very close to the OECD-wide average.4
An important institutional fact about the Portuguese labor market is that nearly all
jobs are covered by collective bargaining contracts. Indeed, until very recently the contracts
negotiated between major employer groups and trade unions were automatically extended
to all workplaces in the same industry and region. Since these contracts are gender-neutral
(i.e., they set wages for jobs regardless of gender), they may have some equalizing impact on
the relative pay of women in Portugal. As shown in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), however,
both male and female workers typically earn a signicant wage premium over their base
pay rate (a so-called wage cushion). Moreover, employers have wide latitude in assigning
workers to job categories, and in promoting workers to higher categories. We suspect that
the combination of these features lessens the impact of collective bargaining on the gender
pay gap and leaves substantial room for factors like willingness to negotiate and bargaining
skill to a¤ect wages.
4The OECD Family databaseshows the gender gap in median full time earnings was 16% in Portugal,
19% in the U.S., and 16% on average across 26 OECD countries (OECD, 2012).
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1.1 Data Sources
Our wage data are derived from the Quadros de Pessoal (QP), an annual census of private
sector employees conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. Firms with at least
one paid employee are required to submit information on their full workforce as of the survey
reference week (in October). Government employees and individuals working as independent
contractors are excluded from coverage.5 There is also no information on people who are
unemployed or out of the labor force during the reference week. Over our 8-year sample
period from 2002 to 2009, the QP contains 20 million observations on 4.5 million di¤erent
individuals.
The QP asks rms to report each employees gender, date of birth, occupation, education,
date of hire, regular monthly salary, other wage payments, and hours of work. Information
is also collected on the industry, location, and founding date of the rm, shareholder equity,
and gross sales (in the preceding calendar year). We construct an hourly wage by dividing
a workers salary and regular earnings supplements by his or her normal hours of work.
The ability to measure a point-in-time hourly wage is a unique strength of the QP and
substantially reduces the potential impact of di¤erential hours of work between men and
women on the gender wage gap.6 We deate all nominal quantities using the Consumer
Price Index (2009=100).
We augment the wage information in QP with rm-specic balance sheet information for
non-banking rms from Bureau van Dijks SABI(Sistema de Analisis de Balances Ibericos)
database. Businesses in Portugal are required to le balance sheet information and prot
and loss statements each year.7 These data are publicly available and are collected by various
agencies and compiled by Bureau van Dijk into the SABI database. Information in SABI
5Firm owners are included in the data set but do not report wages, and so are excluded from our analysis.
6Di¤erences in hours of work between men and women play a major role in explaining earnings di¤erences
in the U.S., particularly among the highly skilled. Wood, Corcoran and Courant (1993) and Bertrand,
Goldin and Katz (2010) nd important hours gaps between male and female lawyers and MBA graduates,
respectively.
7These are led with the Conservatoria do Registro Comercial. The same agency also keeps track of
changes in ownership and organizational structure of rms. Based on informal discussions with rm owners
we believe the penalties for non-ling are small, possibly accounting for missing data for many rms.
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includes the rms name, address, industry, and founding date, as well as various balance sheet
entries (including sales and the value of intermediate inputs) and total employment. SABI
data are available from 2000 onward, but coverage of the database widened substantially in
2005 and information on employment is only relatively complete after 2006.
Since the QP does not include rm names (or tax identication codes) that would permit
a direct match with SABI, we use a combination of variables that are common to both
data sets to conduct a fuzzymatch. Specically, we use detailed location, industry, rm
creation date, annual sales and end-of-year shareholder capital as matching variables. As
described in the Data Appendix, we successfully matched about 53% of rms that appear
in the QP between 2002 and 2009 to a rm with at least one years information in SABI.
More information on our matching procedure and the match rates for various subgroups is
presented in the Data Appendix. The match rate is relatively constant for rms with between
11 and 500 employees (around 68%), but lower for rms with 10 or fewer workers (51%) and
for the largest rms (over 500 workers) many of which are in the banking sector. Overall,
we have current year employer nancial data for about 66% of the person-year observations
in our QP sample from the 2006-2009 sub-period when information in SABI is relatively
complete.
1.2 Analysis Samples
Our primary analysis sample consists of person-year observations for individuals who are
between 19 and 65 years of age, have more than one year of potential labor market exper-
ience, and are employed as a paid worker in the reference period. After excluding data for
individuals with inconsistent employment histories (see the Data Appendix) we arrive at a
data set containing 16.3 million person-year observations on 3.9 million workers 2.1 million
men and 1.7 million women described in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1. As noted in Table A1
of the Data Appendix the characteristics of this sample are very similar to the characteristics
of the full QP sample.
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A comparison between columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 shows that female workers in Portugal
are slightly younger than their male counterparts (rows 1-3) but better educated (rows 4-8).
Despite the education advantage women earn about 18% less per hour (row 9) very similar
to the gender gap in median hourly wages in the U.S. in 2007 (EPI, 2010). Women also
work slightly fewer hours per month, though the di¤erence (3%) is small by international
standards.8 The dispersion in monthly hours is larger for women than men (row 12), while
the dispersion in hourly wages is smaller (row 10). Rows 13 and 14 show the fractions of the
sample in the two largest urban areas in the country (Lisbon and Oporto), which together
account for about one-half of all workers in Portugal.
Rows 15 and 16 show average rm size for men and women and the average fraction of
female employees at mens and womens workplaces. As is true in the U.S. and the U.K.,
women in Portugal work at somewhat larger rms than men.9 More striking is the wide
disparity (70% vs. 24%) in the share of female employees at womens and mens employers
(row 16), suggesting that there is signicant gender segregation across rms in Portugal.10
Indeed, male workers at all-male rms account for 21% of male person-years in our analysis
sample, while female workers at all-female rms account for 19%.11
Wages of workers at gender segregated rms are relatively low: the mean log wage for
men at all-male rms is 1.28 (31% below the average for all men) while the mean wage for
women at all-female rms is 1.19 (22% below the average for all women). Surprisingly to
us, these averages imply that that the gender wage gap between workers at fully segregated
rms is substantially smaller than the gap in the labor market as a whole (9% versus 18%).
8Data reported by the OECD (2012) for Portugal (based on labor force survey data that includes the
government sector and independent contract workers excluded from QP) shows part-time employment rates
for men and women of 8% and 14%, respectively. The same source shows part-time employment rates for
men and women in the US of 8% and 17%.
9Papps (2012) and Mumford and Smith (2008) report roughly 10% larger workplace sizes for women than
men in the U.S. and U.K., respectively.
10Mumford and Smith (2008, online Appendix Table A2) report that in the U.K. in 2004 the average
fraction of female employees at the workplace was 70% for women and 34% for men, which implies somewhat
less segregation by gender than in Portugal.
11Construction and trade account for 43% and 20%, respectively, of the person-year observations at all-
male jobs. All-female workplaces are prevalent in trade (23% of person-years at all female rms), health
services (17%), hotels (14%), and textiles (13%).
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While the average gender wage gap in the 2000s in Portugal was about 18%, the gap
was gradually narrowing over the decade, as shown in Figure 1. Between 2002 and 2008, real
wages of men were nearly constant, while real wages of women were rising slightly. In 2009
the rst year of the subsequent major recession in Portugal nominal wages of both men
and women grew by about 3% (the same pace as in the previous 6 years) but the rate of
ination dropped from around 3% to -1%, yielding a jump in real wages for both genders.
Overall, the gender gap in log hourly wages narrowed from 21% in 2002 to 16% in 2009.
As described in more detail below, we estimate gender-specic wage determination models
with worker and rm xed e¤ects on subsamples of people employed at rms in the largest
connected setsof rms that employ men or women.12 The characteristics of the men and
women who are observed working at these rms are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.
Overall, 91% of all person-year observations for male workers and 88% of all person-year
observations for female workers are included in the largest connected sets. The included
workers have very similar demographic characteristics and labor market outcomes as those
in our overall analysis sample. In particular, the mean gender wage gap is only 1 point
wider (0.19 versus 0.18) for men and women in the largest connected sets than in our overall
analysis sample.
In much of our analysis we further limit attention to workers who are employed at rms
that are in the connected sets for both men and women. (These rms, by denition, employ
both men and women). This doubly connectedsample described in columns 5 and 6 of
Table 1  includes 66% of the person years of male workers in our analysis sample, and
69% of the person years of female workers. Individuals in the doubly connected set have
higher education than in the workforce as a whole, and also have higher average wages:
12% higher for men and 7% higher for women. The gender wage gap is somewhat larger
12See Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) for discussion of connected sets. A rm is directly connected
to another rm if there is at least one worker who is observed working at both rms (at di¤erent points of
time). A rm is indirectly connected to another if there is a sequence of directly connected rms linking the
two. The largest connected set of rms is the largest set of rms that are directly or indirectly connected to
each other.
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in this sample than in our overall sample (23% versus 18%) reecting the omission of the
gender-segregated rms, which as noted earlier have a relatively small gender gap. Firms
in the doubly connected set are a little larger (row 15) and less gender-segregated than the
population of rms in Portugal, as evidenced by the smaller disparity between the average
fractions of female employees at mens and womens employers (row 16).
Finally, columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 show the characteristics of women and men whose
employer in a given year can be matched to current year nancial data. The age and education
levels of these workers are quite similar to those in our full analysis sample. Mean wages of
men at rms with nancial data are 2 log points lower than in the full analysis sample, while
mean wages of women at rms with nancial data are 3 log points lower, implying a slightly
larger gender wage gap among these workers than in our overall analysis sample (19% versus
18%). As shown in row 17, there is a similar 18 log point gap in mean value added per worker
between male jobs and female jobs, suggesting that some of the gender wage gap may be due
to the sorting of female workers to less protable rms - an e¤ect we discuss in more detail
below.
2 Modeling Framework
We turn now to developing a simple econometric model that allows us to evaluate the e¤ect
of gender di¤erences in bargaining aptitude and willingness to negotiate on the observed
wages of women and men. Consider a longitudinal setting where we observe the wages of
individual workers (indexed by i) in multiple periods (indexed by t). In period t individual i
is observed working at a specic rm j = j(i; t), that is uniquely specied given the identify
of the worker and the time period.13 To simplify notation we denote the rm simply by j.
We also denote the gender of worker i by g 2 fF;Mg.
We posit a rent-sharing model where, in each period, the workers log wage (wit) equals her
market alternative (ait) plus a gender-specic share (g 2 [0; 1]) of the surplus Sijt generated
13In the small number of cases of dual job holding, we assign each worker his or her highest-earning job.
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by the job match between worker i and rm j in period t:
wit = ait + 
gSijt: (1)
The recent negotiation literature argues that F < M , which will lead to lower wages among
women, particularly those in employment relationships with a higher surplus.
We decompose the surplus Sijt into three components:
Sijt = Sj + vjt +mij: (2)
The rst component, Sj, is the average level of surplus across all workers and all time periods
at rm j. The second component vjt represents a rm-wide time-varying component of the
surplus, attributable to factors like changes in output market conditions or input prices. The
third component is a time-invariant match-specic component, attributable to idiosyncratic
features of the worker and the rm (i.e., any unique source of complementarity). We assume
that the pure match components at each rm have mean zero for each gender.
We also decompose the market alternative wage ait of the worker into a time invariant
intercept i, a component due to a linear combination of time varying covariates Xit (e.g.,
labor market experience and changing market returns to education), and a time varying
component "it:
ait = i +X
0
it
g + "it; (3)
where g is a gender specic vector of coe¢ cients on the time varying factors. We assume
that "it has mean zero for each individual in each period.
Together, these specications imply a wage model of the form:
wit = i +  
g
j +X
0
it
g + rit: (4)
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where  gj  g Sj; and rit  gvjt + gmij + "it is a composite error.14 For OLS estimation
of (4) to yield unbiased estimates of the worker and rm e¤ects, we need for the following
three conditions to hold: i) E [ritXitjg] = 0 for every gender g, ii) E [ritji] = 0 for every
worker i, and iii) E [ritjj; g] = 0 for every rm j and gender g. Condition iii is often referred
to as an exogenous mobilityrestriction, which will hold if the sorting of workers to rms
depends only on the person e¤ects and the time-invariant rm-e¤ects, and is independent of
the residual components of wages. We discuss this condition at length below and provide
some evidence that it is satised.
For each gender, equation (4) is equivalent to the two-way xed e¤ects model of wage
determination considered by Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999), and many subsequent
authors (see Card, Heining and Kline, 2013 for a brief review of this literature). For our
purposes, the key prediction is that the rm e¤ects for female and male workers at rm j are
related in a very simple way:
 Fj = (
F=M) Mj :
In particular, if women obtain a smaller share of the surplus than men, the rm e¤ects
for women will be proportional to the rm e¤ects for men, with a factor of proportionality
F=M < 1. This has a number of testable implications for the relative variation in wages of
men and women between rms and within rms over time.
14More generally,  could vary across people with F and M being the mean values for women and
men. This random coe¢ cient formulation would add another component to the residual of equation (4)
representing the deviation of the person-specic bargaining parameter from the gender mean, multiplied
by surplus associated with the job at the individuals employer. Another extension could allow di¤erential
sharing of the permanent and transitory components of the job-match surplus. Guiso et al. (2005) nd that
wages are much less sensitive to transitory prot changes than to permanent shifts, suggesting that it may
be reasonable to allow a di¤erent bargaining share for the component vjt in the residual rit:
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3 Between Firm Wage Di¤erentials
3.1 Model Predictions
Equation (4) has straightforward implications for the wage changes of men and women who
move between any pair of origin and destination rms. Under the assumption that job
mobility is independent of the idiosyncratic match components of job surplus (i.e., the mij
terms),15 the expected wage change for males who move from rm 1 to rm 2 between periods
t  1 and t is:
E [witjg = M; j (i; t  1) = 1; j (i; t) = 2] = XitM + M
 
S2   S1 + v2;t   v1;t 1

(5)
where  denotes the rst di¤erence operator. The expected wage change for females who
make the same job transition is:
E [witjg = F; j (i; t  1) = 1; j (i; t) = 2] = XitF + F
 
S2   S1 + v2;t   v1;t 1

(6)
After adjusting for the impacts of the time-varying Xit, the expected wage change for
female job movers is proportional to the expected change for men who make the same trans-
ition, with a factor of proportionality F=M . Intuitively, if women get a smaller share of
the job surplus, then between-rm moves from less-protable to more-protable rms will
benet men more than women, while movements in the opposite direction will hurt women
less than men. We can test this prediction by examining the average wages changes of groups
of male and female job movers who move between matched subsets of rms, and relating the
wage changes for women to the corresponding changes for men.
15See Card, Heining and Kline (2013) for a detailed discussion. If job mobility is unrelated to the individual
component of the match surplus, then wage changes of workers who move from one group of rms to another
will be equal in magnitude and opposite in sign to the wage changes of those who move in the opposite
direction. We provide evidence of (approximate) symmetry in wage changes below.
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3.2 A Simple Descriptive Analysis of Gains to Mobility
As a starting point for our analysis we conduct a study of wage mobility along the lines
suggested by equations (5) and (6), using workers in the doubly connected sample described
in columns 5-6 of Table 1. We begin by tting a wage prediction model to male workers in the
sample, using a basic set of rm characteristics: industry (20 categories), average rm size and
its square, and dummies for location in Lisbon or Oporto. We then use the predicted values
from this model to assign all worker-rm-year observations into job qualityquartiles.16
Finally, we construct average wages in the years before and after a move for male and female
job-changers who are observed moving between di¤erent origin and destination quartiles. To
ensure a balanced sample, we limit attention to movers with at least two years of wage data
at the origin rm and two years at the destination rm.
Figure 2a shows the wage proles for males and females who start at the lowest-quartile
rms and move to other rms in quartiles 1, 2, 3, and 4. Figure 2b shows the corresponding
proles for workers who start in the highest quartile rms. A number of interesting patterns
are apparent in the two gures. First, all the wage proles are upward sloping, reecting the
fact that most job movers are relatively young and are experiencing some real wage growth.
Second, the entire prole of wages for women in a given origin-destination group lies below
the prole for men in the same mobility group, reecting the existence of relatively large
gender wage gaps even conditioning on the qualityof both the origin and destination rm
of job changers. Third, job changes up the rm quality distribution (e.g., from quartile 1
to quartile 4) are associated with positive wages gains relative to changes in the opposite
direction. Fourth, the wage proles of di¤erent origin-destination groups are approximately
parallel in the years before and after a move. There is little indication that wages of people
who will mover to higher quality rms are trending upward faster in the period before their
move than those who move to lower quality rms.
Table 2 presents more detailed information on wages in the years before and after a job
16Since predicted wages are based on time-invariant rm-level variables, jobs at any particular rm are
assigned the same quartile for male and female workers in all years.
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change for males and females in all 16 origin/destination groups. We show the data for
movers from quartile 1 to quartile 2, for example, under the subheading Q1 to Q2. For
each origin/destination group we also show the wage change from the last year on the old job
to the rst year on the new job (in the rows labeled wage change) and a trend-adjusted
wage change (in bold font), which adjusts the wage changes for workers in di¤erent origin-
destination groups by subtracting o¤the wage change for workers who switch jobs but remain
in the same quartile as they started. We also show the number of observations in each origin-
destination group, and the fraction of job changers from a given origin quartile who end in
each of the four destination groups.
Inspection of the trend adjusted wage changes in Table 2 conrms that job changers who
join a rm in a higher predicted wage quartile (based on its industry, size, and location)
experience a relative wage gain, while those who move to a rm in a lower predicted wage
quartile experience a relative wage loss. Interestingly, these relative gains and losses are
approximately symmetric. For example, the relative wage gain for males who start in a
quartile 1 rm and move to a quartile 4 rm is 9% on average, while the relative wage loss
for those who move in the opposite direction is -13%. Symmetry of the losses and gains for
movers in opposite directions is predicted by the simple model of equations (5) and (6), which
assumes that mobility is independent of the worker-specic job-match components of pay.
A second important observation is that although we have based the rm rankings in Figure
2 and Table 2 on predicted male wages, the wage gains of women who make a particular job
transition (e.g., from quartile 1 to quartile 4 rms) are similar to the relative gains of men.
Figure 3 plots the wage gains for women in each of the 16 origin-destination cells in Table 2
against the corresponding wage gains for men. Most of the points are below the 45-degree
line, suggesting that the average wage gain of women for any job change is 1-2 percentage
points lower than the corresponding wage gain for men.17 Across the 16 origin-destination
17Loprest (1992) noted that that job mobility has a 2-3 percentage point smaller e¤ect on wage growth for
female than male workers, using longitudinal data from the NLSY. She also showed that the slower growth
was not due to di¤erences in the job characteristics of the origin or destination jobs.
15
groups, however, the slope of the relation between the female and male wage gains (shown
by the solid line in the gure) is only slightly less than 1. (The estimated slope is 0.96,
with a 95% condence interval of 0.81 to 1.12). Thus, it appears that the relative benets
of moving to a better-paying rm are not too di¤erent for men and women. Figure 4 plots
the trend-adjusted relative wage changes for women against the corresponding changes for
men. Again, it appears that women benet almost as much as men from a given job change,
though with only 12 trend-adjusted wage changes we cannot rule out a fairly wide range for
the relative benet of women. (The 95% condence interval for the estimated slope ranges
from 0.86 to 1.06).
A nal interesting feature of the data in Table 2 is that the relative fractions of men and
women moving from a given origin group to each of the four alternative destination groups
are quite similar.18 In the case of workers who start at quartile 1 rms, for example, 64.7%
of both women and men move to other rms in quartile 1, while 5.6% of men and 4.9% of
women move to quartile 4 rms. This similarity suggests that the mobility process is broadly
similar for men and women in the Portuguese labor market. Nevertheless, as noted, women
tend to gain 1-2 percent less for each job-to-job transition than do men, contributing to a
widening of the gender gap with experience. Whether this lower return to mobility is due
to a gender gap in bargaining skill is unclear. The fact that the return is about the same
regardless of the size of the wage change experienced by men who make the same type of
change suggests to us that it may be due to other factors for example, a di¤erence between
men and women in the fraction of job changes that are made to accommodate a change in
the spouses job location.19
18We dene the quartiles so one-quarter of all person-year observations are in each quartile. On average
slightly more men are in quartile 4 than quartile 1 (25.7% versus 24.1%) whereas for women the opposite is
true (26.1% in quartile 1 versus 24.1% in quartile 4).
19Mincer (1978) hypothesized that a larger fraction of men than women are tied moverswhose change
in location is driven by a change in the location of their spouses job. We cannot match couples in the QP
to test this hypothesis directly.
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3.3 Analysis Based on Worker-Firm Models
3.3.1 Normalization Issues
We turn now to a more comprehensive analysis of gender di¤erences in pay premiums across
rms. Building directly on equation (4), we t models that include person e¤ects (i),
gender-specic rm e¤ects ( gj ), and a set of time-varying observable covariates with gender-
specic coe¢ cients. The worker and rm e¤ects for each gender group are only separately
identied within a connected set of rms linked by worker mobility (see Abowd, Creecy, and
Kramarz, 2002). To simplify estimation, we restrict our analysis to the largest connected set
of establishments for each gender. This allows us to identify the worker and rm e¤ects for
each gender, subject to a single normalization for each group.20
Because we are interested in comparing rm e¤ects across genders, we need to impose
a common normalization across the two groups so that the rm e¤ects are measured on
the same scale. While, in principle, we could normalize any doubly connected rm j0 that
employs both men and women to have a rm e¤ect of zero for each gender, our model
suggests that if rm j0 has high surplus, women will be underpaid at this reference rm
(because F < M). As a result, the mean di¤erence in rm e¤ects between men and women
relative to rm j0 will tend to understate the true extent to which women are underpaid. To
avoid this problem, we seek a group of low surplus reference rms, which, according to our
model, ought to pay both men and women roughly their outside wage ait. To accomplish
this, we make the normalizing assumption that the average of the rm e¤ects for each gender
across all the rms in the lowest vingtile of predicted rm quality (based on the index used in
Figures 2a and 2b and Table 2) is zero.21 The normalized rm e¤ects (e gj) therefore identify
the gender-specic wage premiums paid at a given rm, relative to the average premium paid
20Standard approaches in the literature are to either set one of the rm e¤ects to zero or to normalize the
sum of the rm e¤ects (or the sum of the person e¤ects) to zero.
21In practice, we accomplish this by estimating our model via OLS separately for each gender omitting a
dummy for the largest rm in the doubly connected set. We then renormalize these e¤ects by subtracting
o¤ the mean estimated gender specic rm e¤ect in the bottom vingtile.
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by rms in the reference group of low-wage rms ( g0):
e gj =  gj    g0:
Making the further assumption that jobs at the lowest-wage rms provide zero surplus on
average (i.e.,  M0 =  
F
0 = 0) the normalized gender-specic rm e¤ects provide estimates of
rent-sharing levels. That is: e gj =  gj = gSj;
which allows us to compare rm e¤ects across genders on a common scale. To the extent
that rms in the bottom vingtile actually pay men more than women (so that  M0 >  
F
0 ),
our approach will underestimate the contribution of rm e¤ects to the gender wage gap.
3.3.2 Endogenous Mobility
A concern with estimation of models like (4) by OLS is that the residual components of wages
may be correlated with specic patterns of mobility, leading to biases in the estimated worker
or rm e¤ects. As discussed at length by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), it is possible to
assess the relevance of many sorts of endogenous mobility empirically by looking at a series of
specication diagnostics. The model of wage determination outlined in Section 2 implies that
the error term rit contains three components: (1) a term "it representing the deviation of an
individuals alternative wage ait in period t from its average value in the sample period; (2) a
term gvjt representing the employee share of any transitory uctuation in the average surplus
available at the rm; (3) a term gmij representing the employee share of the idiosyncratic
match e¤ect for individual i at rm j. Each of these components is potentially correlated
with the sequence of wage premiums received by a worker, and could therefore lead to biases
in the estimated rm e¤ects. We discuss each of the three components in turn.
The most important concern with the rst component "it is the presence of a slowly
evolving component in the alternative wage for person i, reecting health shocks, learning
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about unobserved abilities, or other random but persistent shocks.22 The equilibrium assign-
ment process in the labor market may lead to a tendency for people whose alternative wage is
falling to move down the rm-quality distribution (i.e., to rms with lower wage premiums),
while those whose alternative wage is rising tend to move up the rm quality distribution.
This form of mobility would lead to an expected fall in wages prior to a move to a lower
quality rm, and an expected rise in wages prior to a move to a higher quality rm, that
would lead to biased estimated of the rm e¤ects. While this sort of selection is possible, the
data in Figure 2 do not provide much support for it. The absence of systematic trends in
wages prior to a move for workers who transition to better or worse rms in Figures 2a and
2b suggests that there is not a large persistent component in wages that is correlated with
the direction of rm-to-rm mobility.23
Likewise, if there is a slowly evolving component of rm-wide protability that is cor-
related with the direction of mobility (up or down the rm quality distribution) of workers
who leave the rm, OLS estimates of the rm e¤ects in equation (4) will be biased. The
presence of such components will lead to di¤erent trends in wages prior to a move for workers
who transition to higher- or lower-paying rms. Given the absence of such trends in Figures
2a and 2b, however, we believe that the component of the wage error associated with these
uctuations (gvjt) is small.
A nal concern is that mobility is related to the person-specic job match component,
gmij. However, as noted in the discussion of Table 2, the near symmetry in the wage
changes of workers who move up and down the rm quality distribution suggests that the
idiosyncratic job match component of wages is not a major driver of mobility. Moreover, as
we show below, comparisons between models based on equation (4) and generalized models
22Note that purely transitory uctuations in the alternative wage that are correlated with the event of
moving, but not with the relative size of the wage di¤erentials at the origin and destination rms, will not
lead to biases in OLS estimation of the model.
23It is possible however that worker mobility results in part from public learning about signals that are
revealed very quickly and hence are missed by our event study diagnostics (e.g. as in Gibbons and Katz,
1992). While this is a possibility, we note that recent empirical work has found that employer learning tends
to take much longer than a year (Altonji and Pierret, 2001, Lange, 2007).
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with unrestricted job match dummies (which fully absorb person, rm, and any job match
e¤ects) reveal that the idiosyncratic job match component of wages is relatively small for
both men and women in Portugal. Thus, we believe that this component is not a major
source of bias in estimation of models based on (4).
These facts corroborate the recent ndings of Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) in West
German wage data and suggest that the exogenous mobility restrictions underlying additive
worker-rm decompositions may hold in many other settings.24 We note in passing that
the so-called exogenous mobilityrestrictions still allow for very rich patterns of sorting of
workers to rms. In particular, workers may sort dynamically in an unrestricted way based
upon any time invariant characteristic of the worker and any time invariant characteristic of
the rm without violating the conditions identifying the worker rm decomposition.
3.3.3 Estimation Results
Table 3 summarizes the parameter estimates and t of our models for male and female workers
observed between 2002 and 2009. The models include xed e¤ects for workers and rms (a
total of 2.1 million e¤ects for men and 1.7 million e¤ects for women) as well as year dummies,
fully interacted with education dummies (for the 4 education groups shown in Table 2) and
quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with education dummies.25 The rst panel of the
table shows the standard deviations of the estimated person and rm e¤ects and the covariate
indexes

X 0itbgfor each observation, as well as the correlation of the person and rm e¤ects,
the residual standard deviation of the model, and the adjusted R-squared statistics. For
both male and female workers, the standard deviations of the person e¤ects are nearly twice
as big as the standard deviations of the rm e¤ects, implying that a relatively large share
of wage inequality for both genders is attributed to permanent di¤erences in the skills of
di¤erent workers. The correlations between the estimated person and rm e¤ects are both
24See also Macis and Schivardi (2013) for evidence that the exogenous mobility assumptions are satised
in Italy.
25Estimates were computed using a preconditioned conjugate gradient algorithm as in Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013).
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positive, implying that higher skilled men and women are disproportionately employed at
rms that pay all their workers a bigger wage premium. Such positive assortative matching
has been found in West Germany by Card, Heining and Kline (2013), and in several other
recent studies of European wage determination.26
The middle panel of Table 3 shows t statistics for a generalized model of wage determin-
ation that includes unrestricted dummies for each job match. This model provides a slightly
better t to the wage data for both men and women, with adjusted R-squared statistics that
are about 1 percentage point higher (e.g., 0.951 versus 0.940 for women). Comparing the
residual standard error of the job match model to the corresponding standard error for the
model with worker and rm e¤ects we can construct an estimate of the standard deviation
of the permanent job match e¤ects (the mij) that are absorbed in the job match model but
included in the residual of (4). The estimates are 0.062 for men and 0.054 for women only
about one-quarter as big as the standard deviations of the rm e¤ects for the two genders.
We conclude that the rm-wide component of job match surplus is considerably larger than
the purely idiosyncratic component.
We have also conducted a series of additional specication checks of the t of our basic
models for men and women based on (4). These are summarized in the Appendix. In one
check, we examine the mean residuals for subgroups of observations classied by the decile
of the estimated person e¤ect and the decile of the estimated rm e¤ect. We nd that the
mean residuals are very small in all 100 cells for both genders, suggesting that the additive
structure of (4) provides a good approximation to the wage-setting process in Portugal. As
a second check, we examined the wage proles of workers who transition between groups of
rms, classied by the quartile of the (gender-specic) estimated rm e¤ect. These results
conrm the main patterns discussed in Figures 2a and 2b. In particular, we nd that wages
of men and women who move between jobs follow very similar trends prior to the move,
regardless of whether they move up or down the rm quality distribution.
26See e.g., Skans et al. (2008) and Bagger et al. (2012).
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The bottom panel of the gure presents the main components of a simple decomposition
of the variance of wages across workers implied by the tted version of equation (4):
V ar (wit) = V ar (^i) + V ar

 ^
g
j

+ 2Cov

^i;  ^
g
j

+ V ar

X 0it^
g

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
:
Among both male and female workers, person e¤ects accounts for about 60% of overall wage
variation, rm e¤ects account for about 20%, and the covariation in worker and rm e¤ects
accounts for an additional 10%. In both cases the contribution of the measured covariates
(including the main e¤ects and the covariances with the person and rm e¤ects) is relatively
small, and the residual component is also small, reecting the relatively high R-squared
coe¢ cients for the underlying models.
3.3.4 Implications for the Gender Wage Gap
A key implication of the hypothesis that women receive a smaller share than men of the
surplus associated with their job is that the wage di¤erential paid by a given rm to its
male employees (over and above the premium paid at the no-rentrms whose premium is
normalized to 0) will be larger in magnitude than the premium paid to its female employees
i.e., that the estimated male rm e¤ects from equation (4) will be larger in magnitude than
the estimated female rm e¤ects. Since the rm e¤ects for individual rms are estimated
with error, it is di¢ cult to test this inequality for any particular rm. By grouping rms
into cells, however, it is possible to compare the average male and female rm e¤ects for one
group of rms versus another.
Figure 5 plots the mean values of the female rm e¤ects against the corresponding means
of the male rm e¤ects in the cells dened by vingtiles of the index of job qualityused in
Figure 2 and Table 2, restricting attention to rms in the dual-connected set. Notice that
the points lie along a line that is atter than the 45 degree line (the estimated slope is 0.87,
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with a standard error of 0.03). The implication of this pattern is that female employees earn
only about 90% of the rent premiums paid to their male co-workers.
To assess the implied impact of these smaller wage premiums we present a series of Oaxaca
(1973)-style decompositions in Table 4.27 The rst row in the table shows the mean log wages
of male and female workers in the dual-connected set, along with the associated gender wage
gap, which is 23.4 log points. Rows 2-5 show various counterfactuals. In row 2 we assign
the estimated male wage premium to the female workers at each rm.28 Under this scenario,
womens wages would rise by about 3.5 log points, and the gender wage gap would fall to
about 20 log points. Thus, the smaller degree of rent sharing by women than men accounts
for about 15% of the observed gender wage gap. Row 3 reverses the base group and assigns
the estimated female wage premiums to the male workers at each rm. Under this scenario,
mens wages would fall by 2.3 log points and the gender wage gap would narrow to 21 log
points, implying that 10% of the observed gender wage gap is attributable to di¤erential
bargaining.
Rows 4 and 5 consider scenarios in which we hold constant the wage premiums earned
by men and women at each rm, but assume that women have the same distribution across
rms as men (row 4) or that men have the same distribution across rms as women (row
5).29 Assigning women the mens distribution leads to a 4.7 log point rise in female wages 
enough to narrow the gender wage gap to 18.8%. Reversing the process and assigning men
the womens distribution leads to a 3.5 drop in male wages enough to narrow the gender
gap to 19.9%.
Overall, the decompositions in Table 4 lead to two main conclusions. First, the lower
27See Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) for a recent review of decomposition techniques. Our approach is
somewhat novel in that it relies on a theoretically motivated normalization across the two groups in order for
the decomposition to be meaningful. This has some similarities to the reference group problems in Oaxaca
decompositions discussed (among others) by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Fortin (1998).
28Since the rm e¤ects are just the coe¢ cients of indicator variables for the current employer, this is the
familiar decomposition step of assigning the coe¢ cientsof the rm dummies for men to women.
29We perform this calculation by reweighting the female workers at each rm by a weight that is equal to
the overall fraction of male workers at the rm, divided by the overall fraction of female workers at the rm.
This is the discrete version of the technique discussed by DiNardo, Lemieux and Fortin (1996).
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degree of rent sharing by women illustrated graphically in Figure 5 leads to a net reduction in
female wages of 2.3 to 3.5 percentage points, relative to a scenario in which women received
the same wage premiums at each rm as their male coworkers. This e¤ect is modest in
size, but enough to account for 10-15% of the gender wage gap in Portugal. Second, a
somewhat larger share of the gender gap (15-20%) is attributable for the fact that women are
disproportionately employed at rms that pay both men and women relatively low wages.
This latter nding agrees with the results of Cardoso, Guimarães and Portugal (2012), who
conclude using di¤erent methods that roughly a fth of the gender wage gap in Portugal is
attributable to the di¤erential sorting of women across rms.30
It is worth emphasizing that the nature of our xed e¤ects procedure ensures the rm
specic wage premiums underlying the analysis in Table 4 have already been purged of any
permanent di¤erences in worker skill or ability across workers of either gender. Moreover, all
the rms used in the analysis hire both men and women, and are connected to other rms that
hire men and women in the economy by worker mobility hence, the decompositions utilize
a common support. Nevertheless, there are two limitations worth noting. Most importantly,
the decompositions are based on the assumption that the rent premiums at the bottom 5%
of rms in our job quality index are on average zero for both gender groups. To the extent
that workers at these rms receive some rents and female employees earn a smaller share
than males, the results in Table 4 are lower-bound estimates of the impact of womens lower
bargaining power. Secondly, the decompositions only pertain to workers at dual-connected
rms, and exclude in particular the employees of gender-segregated rms. Since the wage gap
between segregated rms is relatively small (9%), however, we believe the rst-order concern
is the gender gap at rms that hire both men and women.
30Cardoso, Guimarães and Portugal (2012) estimate a worker-rm model imposing that the rm e¤ects are
identical across the genders. As our analysis shows, this neglects an important additional source of gender
di¤erence in pay.
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3.4 Firm E¤ects and Protability
The results in Table 3 conrm that rm-specic pay premiums tend to be larger for male
workers than female workers, contributing to the gender wage gap in Portugal. A potential
concern with these decompositions is that they implicitly ignore any sources of rm-specic
pay premiums that are attributable to gender-neutral factors, such as compensating di¤er-
entials for unfavorable working conditions or the cost of living in nearby neighborhoods. To
address this concern we look directly at the relationship between the estimated wage premi-
ums paid by rms to their male and female workers and a simple measure of protability
based on value-added per worker.31
Letting V Ajt denote the log of value added per worker at rm j in period t, dene V Aj
as the average of V Ajt over the years of non missing data available for rm j. Figures 6a and
6b show the relationships between average value added per worker and the estimated rm
and person e¤ects for men and women, using observations in our dual-connected sample that
can be matched to an observation on average value added per worker for the employer. To
construct these gures we divided V Aj into 20 cells, with approximately 5% of worker-year
observations in each cell. We then calculated the mean values of the estimated male and
female rm and worker e¤ects for worker-year observations in each cell. Figure 6a shows
that the estimated rm e¤ects for men and women are both positively correlated with our
measure of protability. Consistent with the pattern in Figure 5, the rm e¤ects for men
exhibit a greater slope across cells, implying that women gain somewhat less than men from
working at more protable rms. In fact, the relative slope of the female e¤ects is 0.89, which
is very close to the slope of the relationship in Figure 5.
Figure 6b shows that the estimated person e¤ects for men and women are also positively
correlated with average value added per worker at their employer, though the person e¤ects
for female employees are much below the values of the e¤ects for men in the same V Aj cell.
31Of course, the anaysis in this section assumes value added per worker is not correlated with unfavorable
working conditions or cost of living, which may not be the case. The next sections analysis of within rm
changes in value added and wages circumvents these concerns.
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The implication of these patterns is that most all of the variation in average wages of men
and women across rms in di¤erent V Aj cells is attributed to di¤erences in worker quality
(as measured by the person e¤ects in equation (4)). Only a relatively small share of the gap
is attributed to di¤erences in the wage premiums received by male and female employees at
the rms in di¤erent cells.32
We evaluate the relationships between value added per worker and the estimated rm
and worker xed e¤ects more formally in Table 5. Here, we present regression models of the
form:
 ^
g
j = 
g + gV Aj + &
g
j (8)
where  ^
g
j denotes the estimated (normalized) rm e¤ect for rm j and gender group g and &
g
j
is a gender-specic error. We estimate these models at the person-year level, assigning each
worker the estimated gender specic xed e¤ect for his or her employer in a given year, and
cluster standard errors by rm. To the extent that male workers receive a larger share of
the rents from more productive rms we expect M > F . The estimates in columns 1 and 3
(from models with no other rm-level controls) conrm that M is bigger than F , consistent
with the visual evidence in Figure 6a. Estimates from models with controls for industry, rm
size, and major city (columns 2 and 4), are a little smaller in magnitude for both genders
but again suggest that M is bigger that F .
A rough estimate of the implied e¤ect of di¤erential rent sharing on the overall gender
wage gap can be obtained by multiplying the estimated gap between M and F (which
is about 0.03) by the average value of V Aj relative to its value at rms that pay no rent
premium. Assuming these are the rms in the lowest cell in Figure 6a, the average excess
V Aj at higher rent rms is approximately 1, and the implied gender wage gap attributable to
di¤erential rent sharing is 0.03 (i.e., 3 percentage points). By comparison the decompositions
32The mean log wage of the male or female workers at a given set of rms is equal to the sum of the
estimated rm e¤ects plus the estimated person e¤ects plus the estimated value of the covariate index.
Ignoring the terms involving the covariates (which are all small), this means that the mean log wage gap
between women and men at a given set of rms can be decomposed into the di¤erence in gender-specic rm
e¤ects, plus the di¤erence in person e¤ects.
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in Table 4 imply that di¤erential rent sharing accounts for a gender gap of 2.3 percentage
points (using the female wage structure as the base) or 3.5 percentage points (using the male
wage structure as the base). The two approaches therefore yield very similar estimates.
4 Within Firm Changes in Protability and Wages
Our analysis so far has relied upon a decomposition of wages into worker and rm e¤ects. As
already discussed, such decompositions are identied by worker mobility across rms. But
our model suggests a lower value of the rent sharing parameter for women than men also has
implications for the evolution of wages of male and female workers who remain with the same
rm over time. In this section we use observations from the last 4 years of our analysis sample
(2006-2009) to measure the e¤ects of changes in rm-specic protability on the wages of
male and female job stayers. In addition to exploiting a di¤erent source of variation, this
analysis has the advantage of not relying on the exogenous mobility assumptions underlying
the worker-rm decomposition of wages.
We begin in Table 6 with an overview of the subsample of workers from the dual-connected
set who are continuously employed for the same rm between 2006 and 2009, and whose
employer has nancial information available for each year from SABI. This sample contains
290,000 men and 204,000 women employed at 33,600 rms. The men and women in the
sample have about the same age, education and wages as men and women in our overall
analysis sample. The gender wage gap in the sample of stayers is also roughly comparable
to the gap in our overall sample, with a value of 23 log points in 2006 and 22 points in 2009.
The rms in the sample are slightly larger than average for the economy as a whole but quite
similar to those in the full dual connected set.
Figure 7 illustrates the relationship between the changes in rm-specic protability
between 2006 and 2009 and the corresponding changes in wages of male and female job
stayers. We group rms into 20 roughly equally sized groups based on the change in log
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value added per worker (4V Aj = V Aj;2009   V Aj;2006), and for each group construct the
mean log wage changes of the job stayers. As shown in the graph, mean wage changes are
strongly correlated with 4V Aj: across cells the slope of the best tting line is 0.059 for men
and 0.046 for women. Consistent with the cross-sectional relationships between protability
and rm-specic wage premiums shown in Figure 6a, the relationship is atter for women,
implying a smaller degree of rent sharing for female employees than males.
Table 7 presents a series of models estimated separately for men and women that relate
changes in employee wages to the corresponding change in log value added per worker at his
or her employer:
4wi = wi2009   wi2006 = eX 0ig + g4V Aj + i (9)
where eXi is a vector of demographic controls and i is a composite error. Columns 1 and 5
show simple univariate OLS models, while columns 2 and 6 add a quadratic function of the
workers age in 2006 as additional controls. In these specications the elasticities of wages
with respect to value added are relatively small 0.028 or 0.029 for men and 0.018 or 0.019
for women but precisely estimated. Moreover, as in Figure 7, the elasticity for women is
smaller than for men. The ratio of the elasticities in columns 6 and 2, for example, is 0.64.
In comparison with the estimated e¤ects of protability on rm-specic wage premiums
in Table 5, the estimated coe¢ cients in columns 1-2 and 5-6 of Table 7 are relatively small.
One important reason for this di¤erence is measurement error in value added per worker,
will be magnied in a rst di¤erenced specication, particularly when the di¤erence is taken
over only a three year span. In an e¤ort to address this problem, we use the change in value
added per worker between 2007 and 2008 as an instrument for the change between 2006 and
2009. As shown in columns 3 and 7, the change from 2007 to 2008 is a powerful predictor
of the change over the longer horizon, with t-statistics of around 60 (clustered by rm). The
resulting IV estimates, presented in columns 4 and 8, yield an elasticity for men of 0.056 and
for women of 0.050. Again, the e¤ect of protability on wages is smaller for women than
men, with a relative magnitude of 0.89 (standard error=0.23).
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Even using the IV strategy the estimated e¤ects of changes in protability on changes in
wages in Table 7 are only about one-half as big as the elasticities in Table 5. An explanation
for the gap is that, contrary to equation (1), wages are less responsive to transitory uctu-
ations in the match surplus between worker i and rm j than to permanent di¤erences in this
surplus. Indeed, an analysis by Guiso et al. (2005) of wages and rm protability based on
Social Security earnings record for Italian rms suggests that wages are only weakly a¤ected
by year-to-year changes in protability. Part of the dampened response to short-run changes
in protability may be due to a reluctance to raise (or lower) wages in response to temporary
changes in protability that will be quickly reversed. In addition, institutional features like
multi-year collective bargaining contracts and lags in the individual negotiation process may
slow the adjustment of wages to movements in protability.
These considerations suggest that the elasticities of wages with respect to changes in prof-
itability over a 3-year horizon probably understate the longer-run responsive to permanent
di¤erences in the match surplus associated with a particular job. Nevertheless, it is inter-
esting that even over a relatively short horizon we nd that the wages of female employees
are less responsive to changes in their employers protability than wages of their male col-
leagues. Indeed, our estimate of the ratio F=M is roughly 0.89, which is very close to the
estimated ratio from our previous designs. Taken together with the evidence from the de-
compositions in Table 4 and the estimated elasticities in Table 5, we believe there is a strong
case in support of the hypotheses that gender di¤erences in bargaining lead to a systematic
wage penalty for female workers.
4.1 Heterogeneity
An important insight from the recent negotiation literature is that gender di¤erences in will-
ingness and ability to bargain can have di¤erent impacts in di¤erent environments. Bowles
et al. (2005), for example, argue that gender di¤erences are magnied in settings where
there is more situational ambiguity, while Rigdon (2012) argues that lack of social inform-
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ation on co-worker pay is disadvantageous for women. We investigated the potential role
for environmental di¤erences in the relative bargaining power of women by tting equation
(9) by instrumental variables to subgroups of men and women, and examining the relative
magnitude of the estimated rent-sharing coe¢ cients, Fversus M . A selection of our results
is presented in Table 8.
For reference, the rst row of the table reproduces the IV results for the entire sample of
male and female job stayers from columns 4 and 8 of Table 7. The next set of rows show
results by rm size. To aid in interpreting the estimates, we show the fractions of men and
women in the di¤erent size categories (in columns 2 and 4), and the ratio of the estimated
female to male elasticities (in column 5). Among very small rms (under 10 employees in the
QP), we nd that rent-sharing e¤ects are very small for both women and men. If anything,
the estimate of  is slightly larger for women, but the ratio is very imprecise. For middle-sized
rms (11-99 workers) and larger rms (100 or more workers) the estimates of g and their
relative magnitude are quite similar to the results for the sample as a whole.
A more interesting pattern emerges when we stratify rms by the fraction of female
employees. Among the rms with a relatively low share of female workers (30% or less), the
estimated rent-sharing parameters are very similar for male and female employees. Perhaps
surprisingly, women appear have lower relative bargaining power at rms where their share
of the workforce is larger.
In an e¤ort to develop a proxy for the degree of situational ambiguity in a workplace,
we calculated the standard deviation of wages among male workers who were present in the
workplace in 2006. We then divided rms into two groups: those with higher dispersion in
male wages and those with lower dispersion. Contrary to our initial expectations, we nd
that that womens relative bargaining power appears to be greater at rms with higher wage
inequality among male workers.
We also estimating equation (9) by industry. Three large sectors manufacturing, trade,
and non nancial services  account for 75% of male workers and 90% of female workers
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in the sample, and are reported in Table 8. We nd that the bargaining disadvantage of
women is relative large in manufacturing, where the elasticity of mens wages with respect
to protability is nearly twice as big as the elasticity of womens wages. In trade, neither
gender group has a large response to protability. In non-nancial services the estimated
rent sharing coe¢ cients for men and women are both relatively large, but imprecise.
Overall, we conclude that there is likely some important heterogeneity in the relative
degree of rent sharing by women versus men. Women appear to be at the greatest disad-
vantage in larger rms, in manufacturing industries, and in rms with a higher fraction of
female employees. Unfortunately, as shown by the standard errors in column 5 of the table,
our ability to precisely estimate the relative bargaining power of women is limited, and none
of the estimates of the relative ratio of female to male bargaining power are signicantly
di¤erent from 1, though the ratio in manufacturing is marginally so.
5 Summary and Conclusions
A growing body of new research has suggested that the gender gap in wages may be driven
in part by di¤erences in the ability and willingness of women to bargain with their employers
over wages. As noted by Bertrand (2011), the real test for this class of theories is how
much of the overall gender gap it can explain. We have developed a novel way of assessing
these theories, using matched longitudinal data that includes wage outcomes for the same
worker observed at di¤erent employers and rm-level nancial information. The key to our
approach is the recognition that there is a large and persistent rm-level component in the
match surplus that drives bargaining over individual wages. To the extent that women obtain
a smaller share of the surplus in their employment relationships, the average wage premium
paid to the female workers at a given rm will fall short of the average premium paid to their
male co-workers. In fact, we nd that women are paid only 85-90% of the wage premium
that men earn at more protable rms. Averaging the shortfall across rms, we conclude
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that di¤erences in relative bargaining power explain about 10-15% of the gender wage gap
in Portugal. We corroborate this estimate using alternative approaches that relate the wage
premiums earned by men and women at di¤erent rms to a direct measure of rm protability
and by studying the relationship between shocks to rm protability and the wage growth
of incumbent employees. Again, we conclude that 10-15% of the gender wage gap can be
attributed to the lower bargaining share earned by female employees.
Our ndings contribute to a growing literature that emphasizes the fundamental role
of rms in the wage determination process (Lentz and Mortensen, 2010). The e¢ ciency
wage literature of the 1980s suggested that employers may o¤er rm-specic wage premiums,
though most of the supporting empirical evidence was based on industry-level data (e.g.,
Krueger and Summers, 1988; Katz and Summers, 1989). More recent research has followed
Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) in using comprehensive matched worker-rm data.
Our ndings provide additional evidence on the importance of rm-specic wage policies,
and show that a signicant share of the gender wage gap arises directly through the rm-
level component of wages.
An important question for future research is the extent to which di¤erences in the av-
erage wage premiums paid to men and women by the same rm are due to di¤erences in
the behavior of female employees, versus di¤erences in how employers interact with their
female workers. While some of the di¤erence may be due to a preference among women to
avoid bargaining (e.g., the nice girls dont askhypothesis of Babcock and Laschever, 2003),
an alternative explanation is that employers and/or coworkers treat women di¤erently when
they bargain, imposing di¤erential costs on women who negotiate (Bowles et al., 2007). It
seems plausible that the treatment of women in the negotiation process would vary substan-
tially from rm to rm, which may explain the emphasis in the U.S. on crafting legislation
prohibiting unequal treatment within a rm by gender or race. However, our results suggest
that even if the genders were equally e¤ective at bargaining, women would still capture fewer
rents by virtue of working at less protable rms. This source of inequality is important even
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within industry and occupation cells, suggesting the pattern is not explained by early career
choices. Additional research is necessary to determine how these di¤erences emerge over the
life cycle.
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Appendix
1. Data Appendix
a. Quadros de Pessoal
The Quadros de Pessoal (QP) dataset for 2002-2009 includes over 20 million observations
on 4.5 million workers. Individuals are identied over time with a unique person identier.
Firms are identied by a unique rm id. To construct our analysis sample we drop the
entire history for a person if: (1) the hiring date for any job is missing or inconsistent
across observations (0:6% of observations dropped); (2) the individual is observed in two
consecutive years at di¤erent rms, but the hiring date for the second job is the same as
the hiring date for the rst job (6:9% of observations dropped); the hourly wage in any year
is too high or too low (0:3% dropped); the change in the log hourly wage from one year to
the next is less than  1 or greater than 1 (1:6% dropped). After these deletions we retain
only person-year observations in which the worker is between the ages of 19 to 65 (1:6%
of observations dropped), with at least two years of potential labor market experience (i.e.,
age   education   6  2) (0:7% dropped) and is employed as a wage-earner (droppping
9:3% of observations). Appendix Table A1 shows the characteristics of the male and female
observations in the entire QP, and our analysis sample. Overall the samples are quite similar
in terms of age, education, location, mean hourly wage, and mean monthly hours of work.
b. SABI
Bureau van Dijks SABI data base has annual data for non-nancial rms including:
a rm tax identier; balance sheet information (with sales and the value of intermediate
inputs); total employment; the rms name, address, industry, shareholder capital; and date
of formation. Data are available from 2000 onward, but coverage expanded substantially in
2005, and information on employment is missing for many rms prior to 2006.
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c. Matching QP and SABI
The following variables are common to QP and SABI and can be used to match observa-
tions for a given rm in a given year in the two data sets: (1) location zip code and county
(concelho) in SABI, parish (freguesia) and county in QP; (2) 5 digit industry; (3) year of
rm creation; (4) shareholder capital; (5) annual sales. We do not use employment in our
matching procedure, but we use it as a check variable.
In QP, total sales in a given year are reported for the previous calendar year. We therefore
use sales in year t  1 to match observations in year t. In SABI, both sales and shareholder
capital are reported in thousands of euro, whereas in QP they are reported in euros. We
therefore round both variables in QP to the thousands. Sales and shareholder capital are
treated as missing if the reported values are zero. The zip codes reported in SABI were
converted to parishes, with the exception of a few codes that cross parish boundaries and a
few that appear to be non-existent codes.
We use a multi-step matching procedure which uses exact matching at each stage, and
sequentially relaxes the number of variables that have to match exactly. Firms that are
matched at one step are removed from both data sets, leaving unmatched observations for
the next step. The steps are as follows:
1. Exact matching based on 5 variables: location, industry, year of rm creation, sales
and shareholder capital. We rst attempt an exact match using sales and shareholder capital
for 2009 (the other variables are time-invariant), then work backwards to 2005. We initially
use parish and 5-digit industry to look for exact matches. We then repeat the process using
county and 3-digit industry.
2. Exact matching based on 4 variables: location, industry, and any two of: year of rm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 1, we initially use parish and 5-digit
industry to look for exact matches, then use county and 3-digit industry.
3. Exact matching based on 3 variables: location, industry, and any one of: year of rm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 1, we initially use parish and 5-digit
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industry to look for exact matches, then use county and 3-digit industry. In this step, once a
potential match was found, we compared data from QP and SABI to check the plausibility of
the match. Specically, we checked annual observations on sales and shareholder capital for
2005-2009. A match was validated only if the deviation between SABI and QP did not exceed
1% in any year for either sales or shareholder capital, or, in cases with a larger deviation in
any one year, if the values in all other years were exactly the same in both data sets.
4. Exact matching based on 2 variables: location and any one of industry, year of rm
creation, annual sales, or shareholder capital. As in step 3, potential matches were compared
and only retained if the same criterion was met.
We matched a total of 301,417 rms between QP and SABI - representing about 80% of
the rms that ever appear in SABI, and 53% of rms that appear at least once (with a worker
in our analysis sample) in QP from 2002 to 2009. Of the matches, 52% were matched on all
ve variables, 31% were matched on four variables,12% were matched on three variables, and
the remainder were matched on two varables. The match rate by rm size (based on average
number of employees in QP) are as follows: 1-10 workers - 50:7%; 11-50 workers - 68:61%,
51-100 workers - 67:0%, 101-500 workers - 69:2%, over 500 workers - 61:0%.
Appendix Table A2 shows the match rates by major industry and by gender, calculated
across person-year observation in our main QP analysis sample.
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2. Model Fit Appendix
We conducted two analyses to evaluate the t of the two-way xed e¤ects models presented
in Table 3. In the rst analysis, we rst partitioned the estimated worker e¤ects into 10
equally sized decile groups. We did the same for the estimated employer e¤ects. We then
calculated the mean residuals from equation (4) for 100 cells, dened by the decile of the
person e¤ect and the decile of the rm e¤ect. The results are shown graphically in Appendix
Figures A1 and A2, for males and females respectively. Note that apart from the cell made
up of lowest-wage workers at lowest wage rms (the "1-1" cell), the absolute value of the
mean is less than 0.01 in all cells for both gender groups.
In the second analysis we calculated mean wages for job movers, classifying each job by
the quartile of the estimated gender-specic rm e¤ect for the job. Appendix Figure A3
shows the proles of wages for movers in the 2 years before and 2 years after a move. (For
simplicity we limit attention to movers with at least 2 years of data before and after a move).
In panel a., for example, we show the proles of wages for men (four left panels) and women
(four right panels) who originated at rms in quartile 1 and moved to other rms in quartiles
1 (rst row), quartile 2 (second row), quartile 3 (third row) or quartile 4 (fourth row). In
each graph we show the mean wage as well as the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of wages.
The graphs show four key facts about the wage proles of movers: (1) wage trends prior
to a move are very similar for di¤erent origin-destination groups; (2) wages rise signicantly
for workers who move from a lower quartile rm to a higher quartile rm; (3) wage fall
signicantly for workers who move from a higher quartile rm to a lower quartile rm; (4)
wages are relatively at for workers who change jobs but remain in the same quartile of rm
e¤ects.
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Overall QP and Analysis Sample
Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age:
    Mean Age 38.9 3702.0 38.1 36.9
    Fraction ≤ 30 years old 0.28 0.32 0.30 0.33
    Fraction ≥ 50 years old 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.14
Education:
    Mean Years Schooling 8.0 8.8 8.0 8.8
    Fraction 6 years schooling 0.22 0.19 0.23 0.20
    Fraction 9 years schooling 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.20
    Fraction with High School 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23
    Fraction with University Degree 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.13
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 1.61 1.42 1.59 1.41
  (standard dev.) (0.58) (0.52) (0.55) (0.50)
Mean Monthly Hours 161.9 156.7 162.6 158.0
  (standard dev.) (25.9) (31.8) (24.7) (30.1)
Fraction in Lisbon 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35
Fraction in Oporto 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Mean Firm Size (Number employees) 668 839 730 858
Fraction Female Workers at Firm 0.25 0.66 0.24 0.70
Number person‐year obs. 11,651,615 9,011,089 9,070,492 7,226,310
Number of persons 2,550,576 2,040,863 2,119,687 1,747,492
Number of firms 431,991 391,982 349,692 336,239
Notes: Overall sample in columns 1‐2 includes all observations available in QP with consistent data for 
age, gender and education.  Analysis sample in columns 3‐4 excludes individuals with inconsistent 
employment histories.  Person‐year observations are also conditioned on being a paid worker in the 
year, age 19‐65, with potential experience ≥2.  Wages are measured in real (2009=100) Euros per hour. 
Lisbon refers to Greater Lisbon and Setubal, Oporto refers to Greater Oporto (NUTS‐3 classifications).
Analysis Sample
 Overall Population of
Employees in QP
Appendix Figure A2: Matching Rates of Observations in QP to Firm Identifier in SABI
Percent of Percent of Percent of
All Observations Observations Observations
in Industry Matched from Females Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 All Industries 100.0 70.9 44.3 73.3 67.8
 Agriculture 1.7 52.0 40.6 50.9 53.7
 Fishing 0.1 84.2 27.1 82.2 89.5
 Mining 0.4 80.8 9.7 80.5 83.7
 Food Products 3.5 75.2 49.1 74.9 75.6
 Textiles 8.0 81.3 71.7 80.9 81.5
 Wood Products 2.8 78.3 27.0 76.7 82.6
 Paper 1.5 79.3 34.5 77.4 82.8
 Chemicals 1.8 82.2 34.2 80.8 84.9
 Other Mineral Products 2.0 81.4 29.3 81.0 82.4
 Metal Fabrication 7.0 80.4 25.8 80.0 81.6
 Utilities 0.8 86.5 17.7 87.3 82.7
 Construction 12.4 69.5 8.3 69.0 74.1
 Trade 19.5 79.4 46.6 79.8 78.9
 Hotels 6.6 75.7 62.4 78.2 74.3
 Transportation 5.9 71.9 22.9 72.9 68.5
 Finance 2.8 27.5 44.4 27.6 27.3
 Business Services  10.6 82.6 49.1 83.5 81.6
 Education 2.1 42.8 76.2 44.1 42.5
 Health 5.9 35.9 88.3 44.1 34.8
 Recreation Services 1.0 64.2 44.2 66.4 61.5
 Other 3.6 30.6 67.1 32.4 29.7
Note: All statistics are calculated across person‐year observations in QP analysis sample for 2002‐2009. 
"Matched" means that employer of person in given year can be matched to firm in SABI.  Sample 
contains 9,070,492 person‐year observations for males and 7,226,310 for females.
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Appendix Figure A1: Mean Residuals for Males by Decile of Worker and Firm Effects
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
3
5
7
9
‐0.02
‐0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Decile of Firm Effects
Decile of Worker Effects
Appendix Figure A2: Mean Residuals for Females by Decile of Worker and Firm Effects
Appendix Figure A3: Wage Proles of Job Movers Before and After a Move, by Gender and
Origin/Destination Quartile of Firm Fixed Eects
Panel a. Movers Originating in Quartile 1 Firms
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Panel b. Movers Originating in Quartile 2 Firms
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Panel c. Movers Originating in Quartile 3 Firms
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Panel d. Movers Originating in Quartile 4 Firms
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Figure 1: Trends in Real Hourly Wage of Men and Women
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Figure 2a: Wage Profiles of Male and Female Job Movers Originating in Quartile 1
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Figure 2b: Wage Profiles of Male and Female Job Movers Originating in Quartile 4 
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Figure 3: Wage Changes of Women and Men Between Same Job Quality Quartiles
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Note: solid line is fitted regression line:
Female change = 0.969×Male Change ‐ 0.018.
Dotted line is 45 degree line.
Figure 4: Relative Wage Changes of Women and Men 
Between Job Quality Quartiles
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Figure 5: Relationship Between Mean Firm Fixed Effects for Females and Males
By Vingtile of Predicted Firm Quality
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Note: points show mean estimated firm fixed effects 
for females (y‐axis) versus males (x‐axis) for firms in 
20 different groups, based on predicted mean log 
wages of male workers at the firm. Solid line is fitted 
regression line ‐ slope =0.87. Dotted line is
45 degree line.
Figure 6a: Relation of Estimated Male and Female Firm Effects to Value Added per Worker
‐0.10
‐0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Log Value Added per Worker
M
e
a
n
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
F
i
r
m
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
Estimated Firm Effects for Male Workers
Estimated Firm Effects for Female Workers
Note: firms grouped into 20 vingtiles based 
on average log value added per worker. 
Lowest and highest vingtiles not shown in 
figure.
fitted slope for
female effects
= 0.132
fitted slope for
male effects
= 0.148
Figure 6b: Relation of Estimated Male and Female Worker Effects to Value Added per Worker
0.90
1.00
1.10
1.20
1.30
1.40
1.50
1.60
1.70
1.80
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
Log Value Added per Worker
M
e
a
n
 
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
W
o
r
k
e
r
 
F
i
x
e
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
Estimated Worker Effects for Male Workers
Estimated Worker Effects for Female Workers
Note: firms grouped into 20 vingtiles based 
on average log value added per worker. 
Lowest and highest vingtiles not shown in 
figure.
fitted slope for
female effects
fitted slope for
male effects
Figure 7: Changes in Wages of Job Stayers vs. Changes in Value Added per Worker
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
‐0.6 ‐0.4 ‐0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Change in log Value Added per Worker
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
L
o
g
 
W
a
g
e
s
 
(
s
t
a
y
e
r
s
)
Male Workers
Female Workers
fitted slope for men
= 0.059
fitted slope for women
= 0.046
Note: firms grouped into 20 vingtiles 
based on change in log value added 
per worker. Lowest and highest 
vingtiles not shown in figure.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Various Samples of Employees in QP, 2002‐2009
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age:
    Mean Age 38.1 36.9 38.0 36.5 38.0 36.4 38.1 36.7
    Fraction ≤ 30 years old 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.34 0.30 0.33
    Fraction ≥ 50 years old 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.14
Education:
    Mean Years Schooling 8.0 8.8 8.0 8.9 8.6 9.1 8.1 8.9
    Fraction 6 years schooling 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.20
    Fraction 9 years schooling 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.21
    Fraction with High School 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.25
    Fraction with University Degree 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.12
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 1.59 1.41 1.62 1.43 1.71 1.48 1.57 1.38
  (standard dev.) (0.55) (0.50) (0.55) (0.51) (0.58) (0.53) (0.50) (0.45)
Mean Monthly Hours 162.6 158.0 162.5 157.9 162.8 157.1 163.8 159.0
  (standard dev.) (24.7) (30.1) (24.8) (29.9) (24.0) (30.5) (24.5) (30.8)
Fraction in Lisbon 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.40 0.34 0.37
Fraction in Oporto 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14
Mean Firm Size (Number employees) 730 858 804 978 1,091 1,230 641 1,117
Fraction Female Workers at Firm 0.24 0.70 0.24 0.70 0.30 0.64 0.24 0.67
Mean Log Value Added per Worker 3.08 2.90
Number person‐year obs. 9,070,492 7,226,310 8,225,752 6,334,039 6,012,521 5,012,736 3,337,923 2,454,616
Number of persons 2,119,687 1,747,492 1,889,366 1,505,517 1,450,288 1,247,503 1,210,220 923,857
Number of firms 349,692 336,239 216,459 185,086 84,720 84,720 159,508 147,649
 Overall Population with
Value Added Data
Notes: Overall sample in columns 1‐2 includes paid workers age 19‐65 with potential experience ≥1.  Sampe excludes individuals with inconsistent employment 
histories.  Wages are measured in real (2009=100) Euros per hour. Value added is measured in thousands of real Euros per year.  All statistics are calculated 
across person‐year observations.  See text for definitions of connected and dual connected sets.
 Overall Population of
Employees in QP All
Connected Set of Workers/Firms
Dual‐Connected
Table 2:  Mean Wages of Job Movers Before and After Job Change, By Origin and Destination Job Quality Quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Q1 to Q1 Q1 to Q2 Q1 to Q3 Q1 to Q4 Q1 to Q1 Q1 to Q2 Q1 to Q3 Q1 to Q4
Mean log wage:
     2 years before move 1.42 1.44 1.51 1.50 1.18 1.22 1.22 1.37
     1 year before move 1.43 1.46 1.52 1.53 1.19 1.24 1.23 1.39
     year of move 1.48 1.53 1.63 1.66 1.22 1.28 1.30 1.51
     1 year after move 1.51 1.57 1.65 1.70 1.24 1.31 1.31 1.55
Wage change at Job Change 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12
Trend adjusted Wage Change 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.10
Number of obs. 12,409 3,261 2,447 1,066 10,360 2,938 1,931 784
Percent of Movers from Origin Quartile 64.7 17.0 12.8 5.6 64.7 18.3 12.1 4.9
Q2 to Q1 Q2 to Q2 Q2 to Q3 Q2 to Q4 Q2 to Q1 Q2 to Q2 Q2 to Q3 Q2 to Q4
Mean log wage:
     2 years before move 1.47 1.53 1.55 1.58 1.29 1.34 1.37 1.39
     1 year before move 1.50 1.55 1.56 1.60 1.30 1.35 1.39 1.41
     1 year after move 1.53 1.61 1.66 1.72 1.32 1.39 1.44 1.51
     2 years after move 1.56 1.64 1.69 1.77 1.35 1.41 1.47 1.54
Wage change at Job Change 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10
Trend adjusted Wage Change ‐0.03 0.00 0.03 0.06 ‐0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06
Number of obs. 3,068 9,863 3,357 1,674 2,032 7,779 2,179 1,333
Percent of Movers from Origin Quartile 17.1 54.9 18.7 9.3 15.3 58.4 16.4 10.0
Q3 to Q1 Q3 to Q2 Q3 to Q3 Q3 to Q4 Q3 to Q1 Q3 to Q2 Q3 to Q3 Q3 to Q4
Mean log wage:
     2 years before move 1.69 1.59 1.82 1.84 1.34 1.37 1.59 1.68
     1 year before move 1.70 1.61 1.83 1.85 1.35 1.38 1.61 1.70
     1 year after move 1.74 1.66 1.89 1.98 1.37 1.41 1.67 1.83
     2 years after move 1.77 1.69 1.92 2.02 1.38 1.45 1.70 1.87
Wage change at Job Change 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.13
Trend adjusted Wage Change ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.00 0.07 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 0.00 0.07
Number of obs. 1,808 3,010 13,746 4,296 1,391 2,274 9,763 3,422
Percent of Movers from Origin Quartile 7.9 13.2 60.1 18.8 8.3 13.5 57.9 20.3
Q4 to Q1 Q4 to Q2 Q4 to Q3 Q4 to Q4 Q4 to Q1 Q4 to Q2 Q4 to Q3 Q4 to Q4
Mean log wage:
     2 years before move 1.72 1.75 1.95 2.02 1.50 1.49 1.79 1.90
     1 year before move 1.73 1.78 1.97 2.05 1.52 1.52 1.81 1.93
     1 year after move 1.72 1.77 2.00 2.16 1.49 1.49 1.84 2.03
     2 years after move 1.75 1.81 2.03 2.20 1.52 1.53 1.88 2.07
Wage change at Job Change ‐0.02 ‐0.01 0.03 0.11 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 0.03 0.10
Trend adjusted Wage Change ‐0.13 ‐0.13 ‐0.08 0.00 ‐0.13 ‐0.12 ‐0.06 0.00
Number of obs. 615 1,261 3,532 6,435 487 959 2,062 3,894
Percent of Movers from Origin Quartile 5.2 10.6 29.8 54.3 6.6 13.0 27.9 52.6
Notes: see text. Sample includes male and female workers at firms in the "doubly connected" set (connected for both male and female workers), observed between 2002 and 2009 with 2+ years of 
wage data at the origin firm, 2+ years of data at the destination firm, and observed between consecutive years at origin and destination firms.  Column headings (e.g. Q1 to Q2) refer to "job quality" 
quartile of origin and destination firms.  Job quality is based on quartiles of predicted male wages, from regression on industry and location dummies and quadratic in firm size.  Trend adjusted wage 
change is wage change relative to change for job movers from firms in origin quartile group who move to other firms in the same quartile.
Male Job Changers Female Job Changers
Table 3:  Summary of Estimated Two‐way Fixed Effects Models for Male and Female Workers
Male Workers Female Workers
(1) (2)
Standard deviation of log wages 0.554 0.513
Number of person‐year observations 8,225,752 6,334,039
Summary of Parameter Estimates:
Number person effects 1,889,366 1,505,517
Number firm effects 216,459 185,086
Std. dev. of person effects (across person‐yr obs.) 0.420 0.400
Std. dev. of firm effects (across person‐yr obs.) 0.247 0.213
Std. dev. of Xb (across person‐yr obs.) 0.069 0.059
Correlation of person/firm effects 0.167 0.152
RMSE of AKM model 0.143 0.125
Adjusted R‐squared of AKM model 0.934 0.940
Comparison job‐match effects model:
Number of job‐match effects 2,689,648 2,087,590
RMSE of match‐effects model 0.128 0.113
Adjusted R‐squared of match‐effects model 0.946 0.951
Std. deviation of job match effect 0.062 0.054
Inequality decomposition of two‐way fixed effects model:
Share of variance of log wages due to:
            person effects 57.6 61.0
            firm effects 19.9 17.2
            covariance of person and firm effects 11.4 9.9
            Xb and associated covariances 6.2 7.5
            residual 4.9 4.4
Notes: See text. Model includes dummies for individual workers and individual firms, year dummies 
interacted with education dummies, and quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with education 
dummies (total of 44 parameters). Comparison job‐match effects model includes dummies for each 
worker‐firm job match as well as other covariates in basic model.
Table 4:  Decompositions of the Gender Wage Gap
Mean Female 
Log Wage
  Mean Male Log 
Wage
Mean Gender 
Wage Gap
(1) (2) (3)
Actual Data:
1.  Mean Log Wage (Workers in dual‐connected set) 1.481 1.715 ‐0.234
Counterfactuals:
2.  Assuming Male Firm‐specific Wage Premiums  1.516 1.715 ‐0.199
        (percent of raw gender gap explained) (14.9)
3.  Assuming Female Firm‐specific Wage Premiums  1.481 1.692 ‐0.211
        (percent of raw gender gap explained) (10.0)
4.  Assuming Male Distribution Across Firms  1.528 1.715 ‐0.188
        (percent of raw gender gap explained) (19.9)
5.  Assuming Female Distribution Across Firms  1.481 1.680 ‐0.199
        (percent of raw gender gap explained) (15.0)
Notes: counterfactuals based on estimated two‐way fixed effects models described in Table 3.  
Table 5: Estimated Relatioships Between Firm and Worker Effects and Mean Value Added Per Worker
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:  Models for Estimated Gender‐specific Firm Effects:
1. Log value added per worker 0.145 0.130 0.115 0.099
    (mean value at firm in all years) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
2.  Controls for Industry, Size, Location no yes no yes
3.  R‐squared 0.166 0.228 0.147 0.198
Panel B:  Models for Estimated Worker Effects:
1. Log value added per worker 0.219 0.200 0.227 0.186
    (mean value at firm in all years) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
2.  Controls for Industry, Size, Location no yes no yes
3.  R‐squared 0.092 0.122 0.137 0.227
Estimated Male Effects Estimated Female Effects
Notes: model estimated on person-year observations (n=2,888,701 for men, n=3,062,812) for men and women in dual-
connected set whose current firm can be matched to financial data. Log of value added is mean value for firm in all years 
observed.  Standard errors clustered by firm (47,477 clusters in all models). See text for description of sample.
Table 6:  Descriptive Statistics for Job Stayers (2006‐2009) at Firms with Complete Financial Data 
2006 2009 2006 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Age 38.25 41.25 37.24 40.24
Mean Education 8.03 8.51 8.51 8.59
Mean Firm Size (workers in QP) 624 723 1011 1413
Mean Fraction of Females at Firm 0.29 0.29 0.59 0.59
Mean Log Real Hourly Wage 1.63 1.70 1.40 1.48
  (standard deviation) (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.45)
Mean Log Value Added per Worker  3.20 3.19 3.00 2.98
  (standard deviation) (0.57) (0.60) (0.60) (0.62)
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Note: sample contains workers at dual connected firms with financial data for 2006‐2009 who are employed at the 
firm continuously from 2006 to 2009.
Male Workers Female Workers
287,707
33,626
203,993
33,626
Table 7:  Models for the Change in Wage of Job Stayers (2006‐2009) at Firms with Complete Financial Data 
OLS OLS
First Stage 
Model IV OLS OLS
First Stage 
Model IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Change in Log Value Added per Worker 0.029 0.028 ‐‐ 0.056 0.019 0.018 ‐‐ 0.050
   (2006 to 2009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015)
Change in Log Value Added per Worker ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.326 ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.350 ‐‐
   (2007 to 2008) (0.005) (0.006)
Controls for Age and Age‐squared no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
RMSE 0.182 0.182 0.352 0.181 0.159 0.157 0.351 0.158
Number of Observations
Number of Firms
Note: sample contains workers at dual connected firms with financial data for 2006‐2009 who are emplyed at the firm continuously from 2006 to 2009.  
Dependent variable is all columns except columns 3 and 7 is change in log real hourly wage from 2006 to 2009.  Dependent variable in first stage models in 
columns 3 and 7 is change in log real value added from 2006 to 2009.  In IV models (columns 4, 8) instrument for change in log value added is change from 
2007 to 2008.   
Male Workers Female Workers
287,707
33,626
203,993
33,626
Table 8:  Heterogeneity Across Subgroups in the Relative Effect of Value Added on Wages of Job Stayers
Effect of Value 
Added on Wages
Percent of All Males 
in Subgroup
Effect of Value Added 
on Wages
Percent of All Females in 
Subgroup
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Baseline Model (col. 3/6 of Table 7) 0.056 100 0.050 100 0.89
(0.013) (0.015) (0.23)
2. By firm size (# in QP):
     a.  1‐10 employees 0.014 11 0.034 12 2.48
(0.015) (0.015) (2.29)
     b. 11‐99 employees 0.062 47 0.056 44 0.90
(0.013) (0.013) (0.20)
     c.  100 or more employees 0.054 42 0.046 43 0.86
(0.031) (0.034) (0.55)
3. By share of female employees at firm:
     a.  30% or less 0.064 60 0.064 15 1.00
(0.021) (0.020) (0.32)
     b.   31‐69% 0.043 34 0.036 45 0.83
(0.015) (0.013) (0.31)
     c.  70% or more 0.121 6 0.060 40 0.50
(0.075) (0.045) (0.55)
4. By dispersion in male wages at firm in 2006 (missing if no male workers at firm in 2006):
     a.  Higher dispersion 0.044 45 0.049 50 1.12
(0.017) (0.023) (0.52)
     b.   Lower dispersion 0.070 52 0.061 38 0.88
(0.020) (0.027) (0.32)
4. By industry:
     a.  Manufacturing 0.060 38 0.031 41 0.51
(0.020) (0.022) (0.28)
     b.   Trade 0.023 27 0.037 34 1.57
(0.015) (0.014) (0.86)
     b.   Non‐financial services 0.064 12 0.073 16 1.14
(0.036) (0.042) (0.67)
Note: see notes to Table 7.  Effect of value added is estimated from IV model fit to change in wages between 2006 and 2009, with controls for age and age‐
squared. Instrument is change in value added between 2007 and 2008. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses.  Standard error of ratio estimated by 
delta method.
Males Females Relative Rent 
Sharing Coefficient 
(col. 3 ÷ col. 1)
